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Abstract 
In this paper, we estimate fundamental bilateral real exchange rates for a group of eight accession countries 
using a panel-cointegration approach for the period 1993-2003. We document a significant positive link between 
productivity levels and the corresponding real exchange rate levels. Future rises in productivity cannot be 
excluded on the basis of either our own analysis or the literature as a whole. Consequently, inflation pressure and 
real exchange rate appreciation in the accession countries probably remain a fact of life in the near future. The 
extent to which this is a problem for a fixed nominal exchange rate regime is hard to determine. Price dynamics 
in the accession countries are still quite flexible to accommodate substantial real exchange rate movements even 
when the nominal exchange rate is rather fixed; moreover, that price adjustment is mostly an internal process for 
the accession countries. Overall we conclude that a fixed exchange rate regime for each of the accession 
countries would be feasible in itself, despite possible future real exchange rate appreciations due to either the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect or demand shifts. We find current misalignments to be small, robust and generally in 
line with the literature. This implies current exchange rate levels provide a reasonable indication of the level at 
which a parity exchange rate could be set. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As of May 1, 2004, ten countries have joined the European Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Previously, most of these 
countries had centrally planned economies. Over the past decade, they have gone through a severe 
transition process towards a market economy. In terms of nominal exchange rate regimes and actual 
exchange rate developments, large differences can be noted across these countries over the past ten 
years. Some started with a relatively fixed exchange rate regime and switched to (managed) floating at 
some point, others worked the other way around with a relatively floating regime in the early nineties 
and a move to more fixed regimes in the second half of that decade. All of them still have their own 
currency and monetary autonomy. However, they share the same long-run perspective of participating 
in the Economic and Monetary Union and adopting the euro as the common currency.  
A major issue in this respect is the choice of transition strategy for each of these countries. 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia already entered ERM-II in June 2004. Other countries will 
presumably follow in due time. Clearly, the choice of an appropriate parity nominal exchange rate and 
the choice of the magnitude of the fluctuation margin will depend on the underlying fundamental 
determinants of the bilateral real exchange rates relative to the euro and on their predicted variability. 
For these countries the development of the real exchange rate is most important because trend-like real 
appreciations caused by for example the Balassa-Samuelson effect may be hard to reconcile with a 
fixed exchange rate regime. More generally, knowledge of real exchange rate determinants may be of 
help in assessing the readiness of each country to move to the EMU.  
In this paper, we analyze the fundamentals behind the real exchange rate for eight of the ten 
accession countries for the period from 1993 to 20031. In particular we are interested in the long-run 
components of the real exchange so as to calculate misalignments. Although many studies exist for 
particular countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, only few are available for the 
whole group of accession countries. In addition, the econometric methodology varies across existing 
work, being determined by the availability of either time-series or panel data. Here, we extend the 
                                                 
1 Due to a lack of data, Malta and Cyprus had to be excluded from the analysis. 
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existing literature through a uniform panel cointegration analysis for eight accession countries 
together. We focus on the external and on the internal real exchange rate and conclude that both have 
caused the real exchange rate to appreciate, albeit to a different extent in the various countries. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop the concept of the real 
exchange rate and present the theoretical model as well as its empirical specification. We present and 
motivate the data and the choice of the panel cointegration technique in Section 3. The corresponding 
empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The real exchange rate: theoretical concepts and empirical application 
 
We define the nominal exchange rate (Ei) for each accession country i as the price of one unit of the 
accession country’s currency in terms of the euro (€). The corresponding real exchange rate (Qi) is the 
relative price of a standard basket of goods in the accession country compared to the price of the same 
basket in the Euro area. We denote the Euro area price level by P* and accession country’s i price 
level by Pi. Then, the real exchange rate is defined as  
 
Qi  = (Ei Pi/P*)        (1) 
 
The real exchange as defined in equation (1) reflects the competitive position of a country. According 
to the strict version of purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis, Qi will equal unity. Less narrow 
versions allow Qi to be equal to some arbitrary constant. Under the assumptions that all goods are 
tradable (and homogeneous across countries) and in the absence of trade barriers, competition will 
ensure that PPP holds, if not in the short run then at least in the longer run. Temporary deviations from 
PPP will be eliminated over time.  
 In practice, both tradable and non-tradable goods exist. To accommodate this phenomenon, we 
assume that a country’s price index P is a geometrically weighted average of the price indexes of 
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tradable and non-tradable goods. The weights are given by the share of the tradable goods (α) and 
non-tradable goods (1-α) in the total added value of a country. Equation (1) then can be rewritten as: 
 
Q i = Ei.(Pi T/PT*). (Pi N/Pi T)(1-α). (PT*/PN*)(1-α)     (2) 
  
From equation (2) one immediately infers that the real exchange rate is a combination of three factors:  
i) the real exchange rate for tradable goods E (PT/PT*), ii) the price ratio of non-tradable goods and 
tradable goods in the respective accession country (PN/PT), and iii) the price ratio of non-tradable 
goods and tradable goods in the euro area country (PN*/PT*). We refer to the first variable as the 
external real exchange rate Q1, while the other two terms are denoted the accession country’s and the 
euro area’s internal real exchange rate Q2 and Q2*, respectively. Equation (2) then can be reformulated 
as: 
 
Qi = Q 1i.[ Q 2i /Q*2](1-α)        (3) 
  
For a thorough analysis of the overall real exchange rate Qi, determinants of both the internal and 
external real exchange rates need to be considered.  If all tradable goods are traded on perfectly 
competitive markets, arbitrage equilibrates the external real exchange rate to 1. However, a number of 
factors may prevent the external exchange rate from being unity continuously or even to move towards 
it in the long run.  For the internal real exchange rate, no unique equilibrium value can be defined a 
priori.  
To model the determinants of both the internal and external real exchange rate more precisely, 
we take an approach similar to Égert and Larèche-Révil (2003). They assume that the real exchange 
rate plays a role in generating both external and internal equilibrium in the economy. In their view, the 
external real exchange rate (Q1) takes care of external equilibrium, which is defined as a sustainable 
current account position. The internal real exchange rate (Q2) serves to equilibrate supply and demand 
for domestic non-tradables. The resulting (reduced-form) model looks as follows: 
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 Q1t = d0 + d1CAt + d2DEBTt + d3OPENt+u2t ,     (4) 
Q2t = c0 + c1PRODt + c2DEMANDt+u1t ,     (5) 
 
where CA stands for current account, DEBT for foreign debt and OPEN for openness; PROD stands 
for productivity, DEMAND is a demand variable.  
To motivate equation (4), we note first that a country’s current account position is central to 
the concept of external equilibrium.  A (structural) current account deficit reflects an excess demand 
for foreign tradable goods. To equilibrate the current account, a real depreciation then is required, 
implying coefficient d1 is expected to be positive. Note, however, that we may find a negative 
coefficient due to reverse causality. An appreciated real exchange rate may in the medium run yield a 
current account deficit. Second, a large external debt position implies interest and principal payment 
commitments abroad that need to be financed by net exports. The higher the stock of net foreign 
liabilities, the higher the structural trade surplus should be and the more depreciated the country’s 
domestic currency value in real terms. Consequently, we hypothesize d2 to be negative. Finally, 
starting from a situation in which the domestic economy is constrained in its trade relations, an 
increase in openness often represents a cut in tariff and non-tariff protection. In the literature, it is 
generally assumed that this will lead to a higher domestic demand for foreign tradable goods and a rise 
in their relative price. Consequently, a domestic real depreciation would result, suggesting a negative 
sign for coefficient d3. Again, however, the coefficient’s sign is ambiguous. An increase in openness 
can also work the other way as it opens the way for higher foreign demand for domestic products and 
correspondingly higher exports. In the case of the accession countries, closer integration with the EU 
not only raises their imports but their exports as well.2  
                                                 
2  In some models, a Terms of Trade variable explicitly enters the external equilibrium equation. Égert and 
Larèche-Révil (2003), for instance, relate the CA to the terms of trade and in a second step relate the overall 
real exchange rate to the current account. In our view, this is inappropriate as the terms of trade – measured as 
the relative price of domestic exports and domestic imports – are closely related to the external exchange rate. 
Including the Terms of Trade as an explanatory variable for the real exchange rate then overstates the actual 
predictability of the real exchange rate. 
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In equation (5), two variables have an impact on the internal real exchange rate.3 First, the use 
of the productivity variable is derived from the Balassa-Samuelson theory. According to this theory, 
less developed countries will typically experience a structural appreciation of the internal real 
exchange rate when they catch up with more developed countries. In the catching-up process, 
productivity in the domestic tradable goods sector will increase relative to that in the non-tradable 
goods sector. Under the assumptions that wage setting in the tradable goods sector leads wage setting 
in the non-tradable goods sector and that wages in the tradable and non-tradable sector will equalize 
due to domestic labour mobility, prices of domestic non-tradable goods increase relative to domestic 
prices of tradable goods. In other words, an appreciation of the internal real exchange rate occurs. 
Underlying this appreciation is a growing productivity differential between tradables and non-
tradables. The variable PROD in equation (5) represents this effect. We hypothesize a negative 
coefficient c1.4  
Additionally, equation (5) contains the variable DEMAND. In the literature, it has been argued 
that in the catching-up process an increase in demand for non-tradables relative to tradables will occur, 
causing an appreciation of the internal real exchange rate as well. Here, the argument is that the 
composition of the standard consumption bundle will shift in the direction of non-tradable goods (and 
services) with an increase in income and wealth. If so, coefficient c2 will be negative. In practice, the 
catching up process of developing countries may simultaneously be an opening up process with the 
rest of the world, resulting in a (temporary) increase in demand for tradable relative to non-tradables 
and, thus, to an opposite effect. Again, the coefficient is ambiguous. 
                                                 
3  Relatively few empirical studies assess the relevance of monetary variables like interest rates and money 
supply as real exchange rate determinants (Smidkova et al. (2002), Lommatzsch and Tober (2002), Crespo 
Cuaresma et al. (2003), Randveer and Rell (2002)). The limited interest in these variables is attributable to two 
aspects. Firstly, in the long run the money supply only determines the price level. Secondly, the real interest 
rate only clears the goods market in a large, but not in a small domestic economy. In the present framework, it 
would only be sensible to include the real interest rate if we were to discuss short-term deviations from the 
long run equilibrium. Given these properties, the present study excludes monetary variables and only focuses 
on the role of productivity and demand variables as determinants of the real exchange rate and on the 
clearance of the goods market via the real exchange rate. 
4  In theory, measures of Euro-zone productivity and demand (PROD*, DEMAND*) should be included in 
equation (5) as well. We will show that our chosen proxy for PROD actually is a relative productivity 
measure, so that PROD* is included. DEMAND* is not included on the assumption that most of the (joint) 
real exchange rate dynamics in the accession countries are determined by domestic rather than foreign 
developments. 
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 Overall, the empirical translation of equation (2), using the determinants of the internal and 
external exchange rate as specified in equations (4) and (5) respectively, looks as: 
 
Qt = e0 + e1CAt + e2DEBTt+ e3OPEN + e4PRODt + e5DEMANDt + ut ,  (6) 
 
It is this equation that we will estimate using a panel-cointegration approach in section 4. As the 
dependent variable, we use the level of the real exchange rate. Note that the transition from equation 
(2) to equation (6) implies a liniearization procedure.5
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
3.1 Variables and data selection 
To empirically implement our exchange rate model, we first note that for most of the countries 
under consideration, it is impossible to find consistent data before 1993. Consequently, we have 
approximately 10 years of data. The use of quarterly data further constrains our selection process as a 
number of variables are only available at an annual frequency. If not stated differently, the data are 
collected from the IMF International Financial Statistics.6 Except for the indices, the data are 
originally expressed in millions of national currency. All time series are seasonally adjusted.  
We define the productivity variable PROD for most countries as the ratio of industry 
production and industry employment relative to the same variable for the euro area as a whole. Only 
for Estonia – where the ratio of industry production and industry employment is unavailable – the ratio 
of GDP over total employment is used. In that case, GDP over total employment from the euro area is 
taken as benchmark. In this choice, we follow a large segment of the literature.7 In related research, 
                                                 
5  In the literature, a (semi-)logarithmic specification is often used with the logarithm of the real exchange rate as 
the dependent variable. We return to this issue in section 4. 
6  The data are accessed via the IFS online service available at http://www.ifs.apdi.net/imf/logon.aspx.  
7  The existing literature employs a wide variety of other proxy variables for productivity differentials, such as 
(relative) wages, relative consumer versus producer prices, total factor productivity, or measures of industry 
structure. Data availability typically precludes tests regarding the relevance of these variables. The exception 
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output per capita is sometimes used as a measure of overall productivity in an economy (Smidkova et 
al. (2002), Lommatzsch and Tober (2002), Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2003), Frait and Komarek (2002), 
Dobrinsky (2001), MacDonald and Wojcik (2003)). However, in our view, output per capita is at best 
a second-best approach for productivity.  
We define DEMAND as the ratio of private consumption expenditures over GDP. The 
advantage of this variable is its availability and consistent measurement across countries and time. Of 
course, it does not allow for the distinction between the demand for tradables and non-tradables. If 
possible, we would like a demand variable doing just that. In the recent literature, consumption, 
investment, government expenditures, and GDP variables have all been used to approximate demand 
pressures (See Égert and Lahrèche-Révil (2003), Frait and Komarek (2002), Filipozzi (2000), Kim and 
Korhonen (2002)). In particular, overall government expenditures or government consumption are 
often used as a proxy for demand pressure. We decided not to use these series for various reasons. 
First, government expenditures and government consumption are not consistently reported across 
countries. Second, over the transition period 1993-2003, most of the governments involved downsized 
substantially due to privatization and the switch from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy. It is unclear how to interpret the government expenditure data in this respect. Finally, it is 
sometimes argued that the government deficit is a good proxy for demand pressures and that it is 
strongly related to the current account. Of course, the national income identity states that the current 
account equals the national savings surplus. This, in turn, equals the government surplus plus the 
private sector surplus. Since we already use both private consumption and the current account in the 
analysis, including the government deficit is inappropriate in our view. The three items together 
almost make up for the identity as only private investment is left out. 
The current account (CA), expressed as a percentage of GDP, requires little explanation. It is 
reported in international databases as the difference between export and import of goods and services, 
taking also into account net income flows from international investment positions. Data on the 
external debt position (DEBT) of individual countries are typically very hard to come by. Availability 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerns the availability of data regarding the price ratio. However, our PROD measure is the preferred 
measure, as it is a more direct and exogenous measure of productivity than the price ratio. 
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and consistency are low. Therefore, we use a proxy. We first compute the balance of a country’s 
quarterly current account balance (CA) and the cumulated sum of the same country’s quarterly net 
foreign direct investment (NFDI) flows. Minus the total value of this variable in a given quarter 
divided by GDP approximates the country’s net foreign debt position. We motivate our approximation 
– in particular the role of NFDI – in the following way. Clearly, a country running a cumulated current 
account deficit for a number of periods needs external finance. One way to attract this finance is to 
borrow abroad and build up foreign debt. Thus, the link between cumulated current account balances 
and a country’s net foreign asset position is straightforward. However, to the extent that the country 
succeeds in attracting net foreign direct investment from abroad, it needs less foreign debt. Of course, 
positive NFDI flows increase foreign claims on the country’s assets. But these claims are proprietary 
claims, that is, foreigners become owners of some domestic assets or, alternatively, become 
shareholders in the country’s future. The foreign owners are not entitled to specific payments but carry 
the risk of low returns on their assets. In our view, only the net debt position should be considered to 
play a role in the external equilibrium position as given in equation (3). For a related approach, we 
refer to Frait and Komarek (2002). 
Finally, for openness (OPEN), we use the sum of exports and imports as a ratio of GDP. The 
use of this variable is quite standard in the literature as a proxy for increased international integration 
and a decline of tariff and non-tariff barriers. However, in a cross-section or panel approach, the same 
variable may also capture differences in size among the sampled countries as smaller countries tend to 
have higher import and export percentages in terms of GDP than larger ones. The empirical results 
with respect to the OPEN variable should therefore be interpreted with some caution.  
 
Before we discuss the estimation method and the results, we elaborate on the procedure of the 
research. We estimate equation (6) in a panel framework. The result is a set of long-run coefficients 
that relate the selected fundamentals to the real exchange rate. To determine the long-run component 
of the value of the real exchange rate in a specific year, we multiply these coefficients by the actual 
value of the fundamentals in this year and add them up to form the estimated equilibrium real 
exchange rate. The deviation of the actual real exchange rate from the equilibrium real exchange rate 
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is called a misalignment.8 Note that a misalignment implies that the exchange rate can be undervalued 
or overvalued. For the purpose of this research, measuring misalignments is important because it 
informs us about potential strains on the exchange rate and on the direction of the change in the 
exchange rate.9  
 
3.2 Panel Cointegration 
We next turn to the econometric methodology. The analysis focuses on the determinants of the long-
run real exchange rate level across countries. In the literature, several econometric methods have been 
used in order to estimate such Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER). Basically, exchange 
rate developments have been analyzed via time-series (see Lommatzsch and Tober (2002), Coudert 
and Couharde (2002), Frait and Komarek (2002), Filipozzi (2000), Égert and Lahrèche-Révil (2003), 
inter alii) or panel-data methods (Kim and Korhonen (2002), Smidkova, Barrell, and Holland, (2002), 
Rahn (2003), De Broeck and Slok (2001), inter alii). In a time-series analysis, the database is a number 
of observations for one country over a specific time period. It allows one to estimate country-specific 
exchange rate developments. However, unbiased estimation results can only be reached if a sufficient 
number of data points is available.10  
Unfortunately, for most of the accession countries this is not the case. Therefore panel-data 
analysis is used more often. This method increases the number of observations leading to unbiased 
estimators. However, the estimation results can only be interpreted as an ‘average’ estimator for the 
group of countries. Thus, the benefit of an extended database comes at the cost of a loss in country-
specific estimates. 
In the context of long-run exchange rate determination, we have to take into account the 
problem of non-stationarity. Typically, real exchange rates as well as their determinants are non-
stationary – that is, they lack a fixed mean value to which they tend to return over time – so that a 
                                                 
8  Note that despite the simple definition, one major problem with the measurement of exchange rate 
misalignments is that exchange rate misalignments are not unambiguously defined. To measure exchange rate 
misalignments, one must define an equilibrium exchange rate, like a PPP rate or an equilibrium exchange rate 
(EER). From the discussion it will be clear that we have chosen to use an EER. 
9  Note that in the misalignment literature it is assumed that exchange rates return to their equilibrium. 
10  The word ‘sufficient’ is deliberately vague because there is no rule for the minimum amount of observations.  
 9
cointegration analysis is required. In a cross-country analysis, it leads to a panel-cointegration method. 
The use of normal OLS techniques will lead to spurious regression and specific panel cointegration 
techniques have to be used. Kao and Chen (1995) have shown that OLS in panel cointegrated models 
is asymptotically normal but nevertheless biased. Even the bias-corrected OLS estimator does not 
improve the OLS estimator in general (Chen, McCoskey, and Kao (1999)). Alternative methods are 
then necessary.  
Phillips and Moon (2000) show that in the case of homogeneous and near-homogeneous 
panels11, the long-run coefficient can be obtained by a pooled fully modified (FM) estimator (see also 
Pedroni (2000)). This method is non-parametric as it employs kernel estimators of the nuisance 
parameters that affect the asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimator. It tackles the possible problem 
of endogeneity of the regressors as well as the autocorrelation of residuals. Kao and Chiang (2000) 
prefer to extend the work of Stock and Watson (1993) and Saikkonen (1991) and propose a pure panel 
dynamic least squares estimator (DOLS). This estimation procedure is parametric and has the 
advantage of computing convenience. In finite samples, it is shown by Kao and Chiang (2000) that the 
FM estimator does not improve over the OLS in general and the DOLS estimator appears to 
outperform the other methods especially if fixed effects are included. The DOLS estimator is thus the 
more promising method in the context of panel cointegration models. In our research we have 
therefore used the DOLS-estimator. 
Practically, we consider the following panel regression: 
 
it
t
titi uXY ++= βα ,, ,        (7) 
 
where and  are two integrated processes andt,iY t,iX
tX stands for the transposed of X . We assume 
that each country shares an identical cointegration relationship (i.e., homogeneous panel hypothesis). 
uit are stationary residuals. The OLS estimator of β is defined as 
                                                 
11 In heterogeneous panel cointegration, each individual/country has its own specific cointegration relationship, 
while individuals/countries are assumed to have the same cointegration relationship in homogeneous panel 
cointegration. In near-homogeneous panel cointegration, individuals/countries have a slightly different 
cointegration relationship. 
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A similar estimator applies when a fixed effect is introduced via a set zit of deterministic 
dummy variables that is associated with each country i. Equation (7) then becomes  
 
titi
t
titi uzXY ,1,1,1, ' +++= γβα ,      (9) 
 
where the OLS estimator of parameter vector (β1,γ1) is given by equation (8) with β=(β1,γ1). The 
ultimate DOLS estimator is derived using the following model: 
ti
p
pj
jtijiti
t
titi uXczXY ,,,,,, ' ∑
−=
+ +∆+++= γβα .     (10) 
The p-order leads and lags are included to take into account the possible endogeneity and serial 
correlation of the errors and regressors, respectively. The coefficients are estimated by OLS and are 
unbiased. The model assumes long-run homogeneity (one cointegration relationship), but short-run 
heterogeneity. In all these models, the estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is in line with that 
of traditional OLS. Several panel cointegration tests have been proposed in this framework (Kao 
(1999) and Pedroni (2000)). Appendix 1 shortly reviews those associated with Kao (1999). 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In our approach, we follow Kao and Chiang (2000) and assume a homogeneous cointegration 
relationship across countries. That is, we assume that the coefficients to be estimated from equation 
(6) are the same for each country. Clearly, this is a heroic assumption as differences in economic 
 11
structures, institutions, transition paths, and economic policies are very noticeable across these eight 
countries. On the other side, we have to acknowledge that the alternative of estimating an individual 
long-run relation between the real exchange rate of a country and five explanatory variables over a 
period as short as ten years requires heroic assumptions too. For this reason, we propose to estimate a 
joint cointegration relation across countries, even though statistical tests may literally reject the 
assumption of a common homogeneous cointegrating relation. Note that we do not necessarily want to 
maximize the explanatory power of the regression. Rather we would like to trace a robust fundamental 
relation between the real exchange rate and its determinants. Being able to combine the information in 
the economic development of more countries then becomes an advantage. Nevertheless, there is a 
trade-off. The more countries have diverging structures and experiences, the more hazardous becomes 
our assumption of a common cointegrating relation. 
An additional caveat is in order here. The chosen methodology assumes that only one 
cointegrating relation exists among the set of variables. This need not be the case. In a time-series 
framework, methods – such as the Johansen-Juselius technique – exist to estimate and identify 
multiple cointegrating vectors in a set of variables. Unfortunately, similar methods are not yet 
available in a panel framework. To the extent that multiple cointegrating vectors exist, the estimated 
coefficients must be interpreted more cautiously, as they can reflect the interaction of more than one 
cointegrating relation. 
To assess the robustness of our results, we therefore estimate a number of alternative 
specifications. Our first model – labeled TOTAL – uses a joint panel estimation for all eight accession 
countries. Based on both the difference in geographical position and in nominal and real exchange rate 
developments, we then split the total group of countries into two subgroups and re-estimate equation 
(6) for each of these two subgroups. On the one hand, we take the three Baltic countries – labeled 
BALTIC – and on the other hand the remaining five Central European countries – labeled CE. 
Secondly, we not only estimate the cointegrating relation for the full sample period 1993-2003, but 
also for the period 1995-2003. Clearly, the first two years in the sample were most hectic for these 
countries, as their transition process had just started. Estimating the panel over the shorter period 
allows an assessment of the impact of the first two relatively volatile years. 
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Before we can apply such a panel-cointegration technique, we first need to establish the non-
stationarity of both the real exchange rates series and the various explanatory variables. For this 
purpose, we use five different panel unit root tests.12 HT(1999) refers to a method used by Harris and 
Tzavalis (1999), LL(1992) represents the Levin and Lin (1992) approach, which gives two different 
statistics and, finally, IPS (1997) refers to Im-Pesaran-Shin (1997) for a unit root test with and without 
a time trend. The results are given in Table 1. We only report p-values. A p-value below 0.05 suggests 
stationarity, while a p-value in excess of 0.05 suggests non-stationarity. Note that for each period and 
each choice of countries, a new set of unit root tests is required. In a number of cases, the tests yield 
conflicting results. Nevertheless, in an overall perspective, we conclude that the evidence typically 
points to non-stationarity of the real exchange rate (Q), productivity (PROD), openness (OPEN), and 
demand pressure (DEMAND). Especially for the current account (CA) and to a lesser extent for 
external debt (DEBT), the tests suggest stationarity. The implication is that the estimated coefficient 
on particularly the current account variable may not be interpretable as a structural long-run 
coefficient, but must be seen as representing part of the short-run dynamics around the long-run real 
exchange rate path. 
Based on these panel unit root results, we decided to run another set of estimations using a 
reduced – parsimonious – form of equation (6). More specifically, we deleted the variables CA and 
DEBT from the specification of the three models (TOTAL, BALTIC, CE). Comparing the results for 
the parsimonious specification and the full model will give some insight into the robustness of the 
results as well. 
 
4.1 Estimated Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates 
We now turn to the results of our estimation. In Table 2 we present the results for the three groups of 
countries (TOTAL, BALTIC, CENTRAL EUROPEAN) and three periods/specifications. The full 
model over the full sample is indicated by (93-03), the full model over the shorter sample is indicated 
by (95-03), and the parsimonious model over the full sample is indicated by (93-03P). T-values are in 
parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The statistics DF(ρ), DF(T), DF*(ρ), and DF*(T) are 
                                                 
12 All computations are performed using NPT1.3 provided by Kao and Chiang (2000).  
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/maxpages/faculty/cdkao/working/npt.html. 
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tests for cointegration (see appendix 1). The null hypothesis is no cointegration. The estimated 
intercept and country-specific dummies are not reported in the table. 
Overall, the results appear quite satisfactory. In each case, panel cointegration – that is, 
stationarity of the remaining residual – cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The (cross-section) 
explanatory power of the regression is quite high and coefficients are generally significant and have 
the predicted sign. More precisely, in all models and specifications, an increase in manufacturing 
(tradables) productivity in accession countries compared to the euro area leads to an appreciation of 
the accession country’s currency. Especially when the Baltics are included in the model, the effect is 
sizable. The magnitude of the effects in the different specifications falls in the range reported by Égert 
(2003), which supports the plausibility of our findings.13
As hypothesized, the sign of the DEBT coefficient is negative and significant for the TOTAL 
specification. Higher external debt implies higher payment commitments to foreigners and thus a 
depreciated real exchange rate in order to be able to finance these payments through higher net 
exports. When the two subgroups are considered, the size of the DEBT coefficient decreases as well as 
its significance. For the CE group, the sign even reverses. Note again the possible panel stationarity of 
the DEBT variable, which may make the coefficient less interpretable.  
A similar observation holds for the current account. We consistently find a negative 
coefficient, indicating that higher (appreciated) real exchange rates coincide with larger current 
account deficits. Clearly, this fits the facts as most countries over the period had high and rising 
current account deficits simultaneously with rising real exchange rates. It is unclear whether this can 
be interpreted as a long-run structural relation because of the econometric problem of the panel 
stationarity of the CA variable. Note that in all specifications, the current account effect is significantly 
reduced in size – and mostly significance too – when the shorter period starting in 1995 is considered. 
                                                 
13 In line with some literature, we also estimated all models reported in Table 2 with the logarithm of the real 
exchange rate as dependent variable and the logarithm of productivity as one of the explanatory variables. The 
other variables were left unchanged. The resulting parameters change in size due to the data transformation. 
However, relative size, sign, and significance of the coefficients remain virtually unchanged. The same holds for 
the resulting under- and overvaluations of the different currencies. We therefore decided not to report the results, 
which are available on request from the authors. 
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We find consistently positive and significant coefficients for the DEMAND variable. Actually, 
this result supports current thinking that trend like real appreciations of the internal real exchange rate 
may not come exclusively or even predominantly from the Balassa-Samuelson effect – which is of a 
supply-side nature –, but also from the demand side through a gradual shift towards expenditures on 
non-tradable goods and services. Finally, the OPEN coefficient is negative and quite large when the 
Baltic countries are included in the specification. For the Central-European countries on their own, a 
small positive effect is found, suggesting that these economies have been able to exploit European 
export markets more than the Baltics so far. 
To further analyze the implications of the regression results in Table 2, we computed the time 
paths of the fundamental real exchange rates for each country under different specifications. They are 
graphically represented in Figure 1 (TOTAL), Figure 2 (BALTIC), and Figure 3 (CE). In the graphs, 
the line labeled REAL RATE is the actual real exchange rate normalized at unity in 1993:01. The lines 
labeled ‘93’, ‘95’, and ‘93P’ represent the three different periods/specifications, respectively. 
A number of points stand out. First, within each estimated model (TOTAL, BALTIC, CE) the 
estimated (fundamental) real exchange rate path is quite insensitive to either skipping the first 2 years 
of the sample or to removing CA and DEBT from the specification. The results thus appear reasonably 
robust against such changes. Second, the under- or overvaluation at the end of the sample period is not 
excessively large. Third, sizable swings have occurred in the past, but differences between the actual 
and the estimated fundamental exchange rate tend to disappear over time. Fourth, comparing the 
results for the Central European countries across models TOTAL and CE, the estimated fundamental 
exchange rates still look quite the same, though somewhat more heterogeneity can be observed than 
within models. The same holds true for the comparison of the evidence for the Baltics from the models 
TOTAL and BALTIC. Overall, we conclude that our results do not display excessive sensitivity to 
model specification and choice of estimation period. However, for a number of countries, the degree to 
which the fundamental exchange rate and the actual rate follow the same path is considerably less 
when the model is estimated for all countries together (TOTAL). It suggests that heterogeneity 
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between the Baltic states on the one hand and the Central European countries on the other may warrant 
the use of separate estimations (BALTIC versus CE).14
4.2  Misalignments 
So far we have looked at the estimated fundamental exchange rate level directly and compared it to the 
actual real exchange rate. Now we turn to the difference between the actual and fundamental real 
exchange rate, which is our measure of the estimated under- or overvaluation. That is, for each country 
we compute the time series of estimated under- or overvaluation. Ideally, we would prefer all models 
to give the same verdict on overvaluation or undervaluation each quarter. In Table 3, we provide 
additional evidence on this issue by giving the matrix of bilateral correlation coefficients of measured 
undervaluation and overvaluation across models and specifications per country.  
For a better understanding, we will elaborate on the results for the Czech Republic. In the 
correlation matrix for the Czech Republic, the upper left triangle contains the correlations of the three 
undervaluation measures based on the three specifications of the model for all eight countries 
(TOTAL). The correlation between the 93-03 and 95-03 results is quite high at 0.85. The correlation 
between each of these and the 93-03P model is lower and slightly above 0.50. The lower right triangle 
gives the same information for the three specifications of the estimated CE model, using the five 
Central European countries only. Now all correlations are very high, the lowest one being equal to 
0.93. In the lower left 3 by 3 matrix are the cross-model correlation coefficients, which happen to be 
quite volatile. While the correlation between all three CE-specifications and Total 93-03P is around 
0.50, the other cross-correlations are negative. More or less the same picture arises for the other 
Central-European countries. Typically, the bilateral correlation coefficients based on one model are 
high – all higher than for the Czech Republic, while the cross-model correlation coefficients are lower 
and volatile. For the three Baltic countries, not only the within model correlations, but also the cross-
model correlations are very high.  
                                                 
14 It is sometimes argued that Slovenia is structurally different from the other Central European countries. To test 
whether the inclusion of Slovenia influences the results for our CE model, we also estimated the model for the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia only. The results were only marginally different from the 
five-country CE model. We therefore decided not to report the results. However, they are available on request 
from the authors. 
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Overall, the results suggest that at least for some countries, the apparent heterogeneity between 
the Baltic countries on the one hand and the Central European countries on the other is important 
enough to warrant use of the two smaller models (BALTIC, CE) rather than one common model 
(TOTAL).  
In Table 4, we consider the evidence on overvaluation or undervaluation for each country 
using the most recent period in our sample, the second quarter of 2003. For each country we present 
the estimated misalignment in 2003:2 as a percentage of the underlying fundamental real exchange 
rate at that time. Using all models, we have six estimates per country. A negative number implies an 
undervaluation, while a positive one indicates an overvaluation. According to Table 4, the different 
model specifications tend to give the same answer to the question of whether a specific currency was 
overvalued or undervalued in 2003:2. The exceptions are Slovenia and to a lesser extent the Czech 
Republic. With respect to Slovenia, the overall model (TOTAL) typically reports evidence of a 
considerable undervaluation, while the central European model (CE) gives a marginal overvaluation. 
For the Czech Republic, the TOTAL specification yields an undervaluation in two out of three cases, 
whereas the CE model consistently shows an overvaluation. For the other countries, at most one of the 
assessments of under- or overvaluation is out of line. In each case it concerns one out of the three 
specifications of the TOTAL model. Since we already concluded that the heterogeneity between the 
central European countries and the Baltic countries renders the overall model probably less reliable 
than the two submodels, we pay more attention to the submodel results, which are in the upper three 
rows of the table. 
Then, our results suggest that especially Poland is significantly undervalued in 2003:2. This 
result is probably mainly attributable to the large nominal exchange rate depreciation over the previous 
two years. Prior to that, the zloty was typically overvalued. The currencies of the Czech Republic 
(about 14 percent), Slovakia (about 19 percent), Estonia (about 7 percent), and Hungary (about 5 
percent) are overvalued. For Latvia and Lithuania we document small undervaluations (around 3 
percent) in 2003. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the standard deviations of the misalignments over the 
sample period 1995-2003. Note that the size of the standard deviation of the misalignment differs 
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considerably across these same countries. In most countries, the reported misalignment in 2003 is less 
than one standard deviation away from zero. That is, given the uncertainty about the estimated level of 
the fundamental exchange rate, the estimated misalignments are small enough to be insignificantly 
different from zero. The overvaluations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia – and to a lesser extent 
the undervaluation of Poland – are around 1.5 times the standard deviation and, thus, statistically more 
significant. 
To investigate how fast misalignments are corrected, we estimate the extent to which the 
actual real exchange rate moves back in the direction of the fundamental in the next quarter. In Table 
5, we present the panel estimation of the corresponding error-correction model. Theoretically, the 
model could be extended to include other determinants of real exchange rate dynamics such as real 
interest rate differentials. Here, we confine the analysis to a simple regression of the change in the real 
exchange rate on the lagged value of the misalignment. 
The results are typical for this type of regression. The coefficient on the lagged misalignment 
variable is consistently negative and significant. This result is in line with the predictions of a 
cointegrated framework that stipulates the elimination of deviations of the real exchange rate from its 
equilibrium value. However, the size of the effects is small, suggesting that in a given quarter at the 
minimum 2.6 percent (TOTAL, 95-03) and at the maximum 8.4 percent (CE, 95-03) of the prevailing 
misalignment is eliminated. The observed slow speed of adjustment is often found in empirical real 
exchange rate analysis. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have estimated fundamental bilateral real exchange rates for a set of eight accession 
countries using a panel-cointegration approach over the period 1993-2003. Given the difference 
between the Baltic States and the Central European countries, we have estimated the model for eight 
accession countries, for the three Baltic States separately, and for the five Central European Countries 
separately. We have not estimated the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect separately, but the estimated 
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coefficient on the productivity variable is quite significant in all estimates, in particular for the Baltic 
States. An increase in productivity in the tradables sector does indeed lead to an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. Concerning the estimated misalignments, the results are robust and generally in 
line with the literature; we find an overvaluation around 15 percent for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia and an overvaluation of about 5 percent for Hungary. For Slovenia, we hardly find any 
misalignment, as documented by others too. If anything, there is a small overvaluation. For Poland, we 
report an undervaluation of approximately 10-15 percent in 2003. According to our estimates, the 
zloty was indeed substantially overvalued around 2001 as suggested by the literature. However, the 
subsequent strong nominal depreciation has even overshot the fundamental exchange rate, so that now 
an undervaluation exists. With respect to the Baltic countries, no empirical results could be found in 
the literature with respect to Latvia and Lithuania. We report a small undervaluation for both 
countries. For Estonia, we find an overvaluation of about 7 percent in 2003. In the literature, small 
overvaluations are reported for Estonia in 2001-2002 as well. 
 From these results, several policy recommendations can be drawn. First, our research shows 
steadily appreciating real exchange rates for all countries under consideration and documents a 
significant positive link between productivity levels and the corresponding real exchange rate levels. 
Moreover, future rises in productivity cannot be excluded on the basis of either our own analysis or the 
literature as a whole. Consequently, inflation pressure and real exchange rate appreciation in the 
accession countries probably remain a fact of life in the near future.  
 Second, the extent to which this is a problem for a fixed nominal exchange rate regime is hard 
to determine. From the evidence over the past decade, we know that the link between nominal and real 
exchange rate variability is quite weak. For instance, in Slovakia the nominal exchange rate has been 
reasonably stable since 1999, while the real exchange rate appreciated considerably over the same 
period. The same holds true for Hungary. Slovenia experienced a rather stable real exchange rate and a 
nominal depreciation. Apparently, price dynamics in the accession countries are still quite flexible to 
accommodate substantial real exchange rate movements even when the nominal exchange rate is 
rather fixed. Moreover, we do expect real exchange rate appreciations to be more modest in the future 
than they were in the early nineties. 
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 Third, our results suggest that a real appreciation mostly originates from movements in the 
internal real exchange rate. Particularly relative productivity and the demand variable are the most 
significant in our regression results. The determinants of the external real exchange rate play a less 
dominant role. We do not have independent evidence on the validity of PPP for tradable goods. 
Overall, the evidence suggests less of an issue on the tradable side than on the non-tradable side. It 
implies that price adjustment is mostly an internal process for the accession countries.  
 Overall, the above three observations suggest that a fixed exchange rate regime for each of the 
accession countries would be feasible in itself, despite possible future real exchange rate appreciations 
due to either the BS effect or demand shifts. Because it seems that the BS effect is not very large in 
most countries (as Balcerowicz claims (2002, p. 68), it is a ‘manageable’ effect) and the inflation in 
new member state countries is not much higher than that of Spain and Portugal when they joined the 
EMS (for example for 2001 both the Czech and the Polish inflation was lower than the inflation in 
Spain and in Portugal in 1994), the research results suggest that indeed “the Accession countries 
should not experience more problems of convergence than the present Euro-members prior to their 
entry into the monetary union” (De Grauwe, 2002, p. 61). With respect to the appropriate level of a 
parity exchange rate against the euro, we find that the magnitude of misalignments was limited in the 
middle of 2003 and fell within the range of 1 standard deviation of the average real exchange rate over 
the past 10 years. In that sense, prevailing market exchange rates (at least in 2003) appear to give a 
reasonable indication of the level at which a parity exchange rate should be approximately set. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Kao (1999) proposes a panel cointegration test based on Dickey-Fuller statistics (DF). Let us consider 
the following model: 
it
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where  and is I(1). The test can be calculated from the estimated residuals 
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Kao (1999) proposed 4 cointegration tests: 
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where  and , Σ being the variance-covariance matrix, and 
Ω the long-run variance-covariance matrix. Similarly, Augmented DF tests can be built. 
εεσ 12ˆ −ΣΣ−Σ= uuv εεσ 102ˆ −ΩΩ−Ω= uuv
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Table 1  Panel-Unit Root Tests (p-values) 
 
    
 HT (99) IPS (97) LL (92) 
      
 no intercept, no trend trend 
no 
intercept no trend 
 no trend     
      
Baltic 93-03      
PROD 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.22
CA 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
DEBT 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.38 0.33
OPEN 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.37
DEMAND 0.24 0.35 0.30 0.18 0.24
Q 0.21 0.11 0.25 0.10 0.20
Baltic 95-03  
PROD 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.28
CA 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00
DEBT 0.03 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.03
OPEN 0.33 0.49 0.35 0.19 0.33
DEMAND 0.25 0.49 0.35 0.17 0.24
Q 0.20 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.20
CE 93-03  
PROD 0.35 0.05 0.15 0.32 0.35
CA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
DEBT 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
OPEN 0.46 0.23 0.46 0.45 0.46
DEMAND 0.49 0.23 0.46 0.46 0.49
Q 0.44 0.03 0.10 0.38 0.44
CE 95-03  
PROD 0.43 0.14 0.33 0.40 0.43
CA 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00
DEBT 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00
OPEN 0.50 0.35 0.37 0.50 0.50
DEMAND 0.49 0.35 0.37 0.44 0.49
Q 0.46 0.04 0.15 0.42 0.46
TOTAL 93-03  
PROD 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.13
CA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DEBT 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.02 0.00
OPEN 0.31 0.07 0.18 0.32 0.31
DEMAND 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.20
Q 0.01 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.01
TOTAL 95-03  
PROD 0.22 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.22
CA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
DEBT 0.00 0.08 0.21 0.01 0.00
OPEN 0.44 0.17 0.40 0.42 0.44
DEMAND 0.25 0.17 0.40 0.25 0.25
Q 0.03 0.20 0.43 0.12 0.03
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 Table 2 Regression Results 
 
        
 TOTAL BALTIC CENTRAL EUROPEAN 
        
 93-03 95-03 93-03P 93-03 95-03 93-03P 93-03 95-03 93-03P 
        
        
PROD 2.35 2.25 2.95 2.44 1.95 2.63 0.37 0.52 0.33 
 (28.44) (28.01) (30.33) (19.85) (14.43) (21.86) (7.09) (9.12) (5.23) 
        
CA -3.62 0.20 - -1.07 -0.40 - -2.15 -0.47 - 
 (17.55) (0.79)  (2.87) (0.63)  (20.97) (4.09)  
        
DEBT -0.52 -0.40 - -0.08 -0.21 - 0.03 0.08 - 
 (10.76) (8.92)  (0.78) (1.62)  (1.52) (3.68)  
        
OPEN -1.33 -0.73 -1.73 -2.05 -1.79 -2.17 0.17 0.16 0.29 
 (19.24) (9.30) (21.24) (20.42) (10.20) (19.96) (3.82) (3.86) (5.21) 
        
DEMAND 0.36 0.54 1.16 1.78 1.27 2.20 0.88 1.96 0.97 
 (2.25) (3.98) (6.18) (9.84) (6.83) (11.36) (3.85) (7.01) (3.41) 
          
R2 0.958 0.979 0.941 0.968 0.971 0.967 0.781 0.822 0.691
     
DF(ρ) -21.36 -18.14 -21.45 -11.77 -7.26 -12.81 -9.53 -10.56 -5.40
DF(T) -5.69 -5.18 -5.74 -4.23 -2.94 -4.55 -3.36 -3.67 -2.40
DF*(ρ) -36.82 -31.21 -36.96 -18.32 -11.52 -20.51 -16.26 -17.60 -10.25
DF*(T) -4.26 -3.97 -4.30 -3.79 -2.76 -3.94 -2.87 -3.16 -2.00
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Table 3 Correlation coefficients of under/over valuation (1995:1-2003:2) 
 
       
Estonia       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P Baltic 93-03Baltic 95-03Baltic 93-03 P
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.83 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.90 0.85 1.00    
Baltic 93-03 0.93 0.85 0.98 1.00   
Baltic 95-03 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.00  
Baltic 93-03 P 0.90 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 
       
       
Latvia       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P Baltic 93-03Baltic 95-03Baltic 93-03 P
Total 93-03 1,00      
Total 95-03 0.97 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.76 0.77 1.00    
Baltic 93-03 0.88 0.88 0.97 1.00   
Baltic 95-03 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.95 1.00  
Baltic 93-03 P 0.81 0.83 0.99 0.99 0.92 1.00 
       
       
Lithuania       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P Baltic 93-03Baltic 95-03Baltic 93-03 P
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.99 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.85 0.85 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.97 0.95 0.94 1.00   
CE 95-03 0.99 0.98 0.82 0.96 1.00  
CE 93-03 P 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.91 1.00 
       
       
Czech Republic       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P CE 93-03 CE 95-03 CE 93-03 P 
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.85 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.52 0.51 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.01 -0.11 0.53 1.00   
CE 95-03 -0.14 -0.13 0.56 0.96 1.00  
CE 93-03 P -0.18 -0.10 0.48 0.93 0.98 1.00 
       
       
Hungary       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P CE 93-03 CE 95-03 CE 93-03 P 
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.86 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.87 0.73 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.43 0.38 0.05 1.00   
CE 95-03 0.50 0.60 0.18 0.92 1.00  
CE 93-03 P 0.55 0.68 0.24 0.88 0.95 1.00 
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Poland       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P CE 93-03 CE 95-03 CE 93-03 P 
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.97 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.96 0.99 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.38 0.31 0.18 1.00   
CE 95-03 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.92 1.00  
CE 93-03 P 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.91 0.88 1.00 
       
       
Slovenia       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P CE 93-03 CE 95-03 CE 93-03 P 
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.82 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.82 0.93 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.14 -0.38 -0.25 1.00   
CE 95-03 -0.26 -0.34 -0.27 0.58 1.00  
CE 93-03 P -0.32 -0.13 -0.22 0.17 0.81 1.00 
       
       
Slovakia       
 Total 93-03 Total 95-03 Total 93-03 P CE 93-03 CE 95-03 CE 93-03 P 
Total 93-03 1.00      
Total 95-03 0.83 1.00     
Total 93-03 P 0.76 0.86 1.00    
CE 93-03 0.34 -0.16 -0.02 1.00   
CE 95-03 0.06 -0.16 0.08 0.77 1.00  
CE 93-03 P 0.45 0.40 0.54 0.55 0.79 1.00 
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Table 4  Estimated Misalignments in 2003:2 
 
         
Misalignment (%, 2003:2)         
 EST LAT LIT CZE HUN POL SLV SVK 
         
Baltic CE 93-03 7.76 -3.34 -3.70 14.48 4.42 -10.12 3.82 18.88 
Baltic CE 95-03 6.12 -1.24 -2.41 12.94 3.54 -16.28 2.94 11.42 
Baltic CE 93-03P 8.59 -3.97 -6.00 14.62 6.59 -11.18 3.61 13.50 
Total 93-03 5.19 1.87 0.27 -14.34 11.76 -38.50 -24.64 17.34 
Total 95-03 8.15 0.77 -4.03 -13.73 27.25 -37.45 -20.07 -2.71 
Total 93-03P 4.73 -6.17 -8.72 4.19 -0.90 -47.63 -21.53 18.07 
         
         
Standard deviation of the 
misalignment (%, 1995:1-2003:2)         
 EST LAT LIT CZE HUN POL SLV SVK 
         
Baltic CE 93-03 16.11 9.89 11.80 9.77 8.77 8.84 4.31 9.19 
Baltic CE 95-03 14.68 11.56 12.89 9.98 7.53 8.49 2.74 4.94 
Baltic CE 93-03P 16.01 10.02 11.20 8.89 8.08 8.69 2.22 5.17 
Total 93-03 12.25 12.05 14.74 13.85 18.85 33.37 11.88 27.10 
Total 95-03 9.26 13.16 13.35 8.57 49.41 42.44 11.66 17.61 
Total 93-03P 10.59 9.38 11.10 24.04 16.68 68.74 13.94 19.22 
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Table 5   Panel Error-Correction Results 
 
         
 Total Baltic Central European 
          
          
 95-03 93-03 93-03 P 95-03 93-03 93-03 P 95-03 93-03 93-03 P 
          
          
Constant 0.012* (6.236) 
0.018* 
(7.856) 
0.018* 
(7.736) 
0.017* 
(5.600) 
0.034* 
(7.728) 
0.034* 
(7.704) 
0.008* 
(3.572) 
0.007* 
(3.727) 
0.007* 
(3.795) 
          
Misalignment 
(t-1) 
-0.026* 
(-4.638)
-0.045* 
(-9.446) 
-0.044* 
(-8.374)
-0.028* 
(-4.560)
-0.062* 
(-8.371)
-0.063* 
(-8.240)
-0.084* 
(-3.351) 
-.042** 
(-2.275)
-0.064* 
(-3.782)
          
          
N 272 328 328 102 123 123 170 205 205 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.213 0.174 0.164 0.362 0.354 0.057 0.020 0.061 
F-Statistic 21.511* 89.236* 70.116* 20.788* 70.081* 67.901* 11.228* 5.174** 14.303*
          
 
Note: The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** denote the significance at the one and five percent 
level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 Actual and Estimated Real Exchange Rates (TOTAL)  
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Figure 2 Actual and Estimated Real Exchange Rates (BALTIC)  
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Figure 3 Actual and Estimated Real Exchange Rates (Central Europe)  
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